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Abstract 
In a study in Brain (2014), Dr. Susan Harkema and her fellow 
researchers demonstrated that the input of an electronic epidural 
stimulator in the lower spinal cord of four completely paralyzed 
patients allowed them to regain voluntary movement in their 
toes, defying the longstanding scientific position regarding 
sensory and motor complete paralysis. Harkema herself admits 
that she thought this achievement was impossible at the outset, 
as she believed that the body is incapable of movement without 
receiving complex signals from the brain. Many cognitive 
neuroscientists continue to maintain this standpoint of Cartesian 
dualism. In response, I argue that the insights of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty provide a possible explanation of the results of 
this new research. Merleau-Ponty insisted that I am my body 
and that the body has its own kind of knowledge about the 
world. This framework serves as the backdrop for recent 
phenomenological studies in cognitive neuroscience. In this 
vein, this essay will consider how Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
embodiment provides an ample model for explaining the 
findings of Susan Harkema’s current spinal cord research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
umbosacral spinal cord epidural stimulation is 
considered to be one of the most significant medical 
breakthroughs in paralysis research. Since the initial 
research began in 2011, it has allowed four paralyzed men to 
regain their ability to move their lower limbs and have a 
higher quality of life. The process involves a small electrical 
device roughly the size of a pacemaker, which is surgically 
implanted in the paralyzed patient and is attached to the 
lower section of the spinal cord in 16 different locations. 
Thus far, the implantation of the device has been used in four 
men whose spinal cord injuries rendered them paralyzed 
from the chest down for life—two of which were clinically 
diagnosed with both sensory and motor complete paralysis 
and two of which had motor complete but sensory 
incomplete paralysis. As a result of the stimulator and 
extensive therapy, all four participants have regained the 
capacity to voluntarily move their legs and have even been 
able “to achieve full weight-bearing standing without any 
external assistance and with only minimal self-balance 
assistance provided by their hands when the lumbosacral 
spinal cord was epidurally stimulated.”i In other words, the 
four men can not only move their hips, legs, and toes, but 
they can also sense them and their relation to their corporeal 
schema and can increase their muscle strength and stamina 
in their lower body. They have also been able to decrease the 
amount of necessary stimulation necessary over time, as they 
have engaged in intense therapy and training.ii  
 
The patient controls the stimulator with a remote about the 
size of a cellphone. When the device is turned on, the 
stimulator delivers a low level of electricity at varying 
frequencies throughout the spinal cord and induces a tingling 
sensation in the lower limbs. Originally designed as a tool 
for pain management, lead researcher Dr. Susan Harkema at 
L 
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the University of Louisville was using it in a study to analyze 
nerve damage when her first patient, Rob Summers, shocked 
her one day when he decided to move his toe while the 
device was turned on. One could reason that Summers’s 
success was the result of the plasticity or rewiring of the 
brain over the course of seven months of therapy. It is 
certainly the case that intense, individualized therapy has 
been an important contributor to the success of the four 
patients.iii However, this cannot be the only explanation, as 
the other three men who are part of the study were able to 
not only wiggle their toes but had success in moving and 
swinging their legs almost immediately after having been 
implanted with the device. In a matter of days, they could 
stand up with minimal assistance with their own hands and 
could do sit-ups. These were men who had been told that 
they would never walk again and had been paralyzed 
between 2–4 years prior to testing.iv 
 
It is imperative to stress that these electrical shocks are not 
merely producing an involuntary spasm in the muscles.v The 
electrical impulses from the stimulator is not forcing the four 
men to move their legs; rather, they can willingly make these 
movements. Further, and perhaps more shocking, the four 
men can voluntarily move their legs and even stand with 
minimal hand support despite the “absence of functional 
supraspinal connections,” that is, even though medically 
speaking no complex signals are being sent from the brain to 
the legs. It appears that the ingenuity of the spinal cord itself 
is primarily responsible for the movement.vi This process of 
epidural stimulation made national headlines in 2014, and 
the research is ongoing with hopes of implanting the device 
into more paralyzed patients and assessing their success.vii  
 
In the following pages I will further discuss the details and 
successes of this research program. The technological and 
medical success story provokes a variety of intriguing 
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questions—questions about the nature of technology and the 
human, about the nature of human agency and its effect on 
human psychology, and about the nature of scientific 
inquiry. However, I am chiefly concerned about what this 
study reveals about the relationship between the brain and 
the body, between cognition and action, and between 
thinking and embodiment. More explicitly, I argue that to 
speak of a relationship “between” brain and body—even if 
such language is seemingly impossible to eradicate—is to 
perpetuate an unnecessary Cartesian dualism. Rather, this 
research demonstrates that cognition is in some important 
sense embodied, that the body is critically necessary for the 
brain to properly function, and that our habituation in and 
attunement toward our everyday activities and 
environmental context must be understood as forms of 
thinking that are extended throughout the body. 
 
In order to explicate these conclusions, I will be utilizing the 
phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and recent 
advances in phenomenological accounts of cognitive 
neuroscience as my interpretive method for understanding 
the findings of Dr. Susan Harkema and her research team. In 
my view, Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical account of 
subjectivity as fundamentally embodied and intertwined 
with others and the world is vindicated by these findings on 
paralysis, and thus, I begin by situating the reader with a 
brief discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s work and his critique of 
Descartes. I will then bring his work, specifically his account 
of habit, into conversation with Harkema’s own theories and 
reflections on epidural stimulation and its success.  
 
MERLEAU-PONTY AND EMBODIED COGNITION  
 
Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) was a prominent twentieth 
century French phenomenologist, existentialist, and 
psychologist whose work has had a profound influence on 
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many fields of inquiry, most notably for the purposes of this 
essay, in the areas of perception, intersubjectivity, and child 
development. Over 70 years before the development of 
spinal cord epidural stimulation, Merleau-Ponty offered an 
account of subjectivity that sought to fundamentally 
overturn Cartesian mind-body dualism.  
 
Descartes famously sets forth an account of subjectivity that 
relegates embodiment to an ancillary role, which continues 
to plague the way we think today. Descartes arrives at a 
detached and disembodied subject in his famous dictum 
cogito ergo sum. He states: “I am therefore precisely nothing 
but a thinking thing.”viii Descartes continues: “It is certain 
that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without 
it.”ix While Descartes maintains that body and mind are 
much more intimately connected than a pilot is to his ship, 
he establishes them as two distinct substances. Mind, or soul, 
has no physical extension, is indivisible, and is immortal; the 
body has parts, is extended, and is finite. As a result, the res 
cogitans is fundamentally distinguishable from the res 
extensa. Neither the imagination nor the body, the latter of 
which is “like a machine” and even described as 
“nothingness,”x play a role in my essential selfhood or in my 
understanding of the essences of objects. The mind alone 
processes input in order to generate representations and 
mental judgments about external objects. Descartes writes, 
“Bodies are not, properly speaking, perceived by the senses 
or by the faculty of imagination, but by the intellect alone.”xi 
On this account, my body, motor capacities, senses, and 
corporeal placement in the world play no necessary role in 
my understanding of objects. Not only do my sensory, 
perceptual, imaginative, and affective capacities at most play 
a secondary role in my understanding of objects, more 
importantly, they are also not constitutive to my identity as 
a self. Rather, the self “clearly and distinctly” understands 
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itself solely through self-reflective cognition, which if 
connected to the body at all, is limited to the brain alone.xii 
 
To this, Merleau-Ponty stresses that thinking is never devoid 
of context; it is always shaped by my history, language, 
interpersonal influences, and my bodily attunement toward 
a meaningful and structured world or environment. 
Cognitive activities in the brain are deeply intertwined with 
the embodied, affective, and intersubjective aspects of the 
human subject, and thus, thinking is not to be reduced to 
what happens in the brain. Our mental judgments have 
significance to us because they are intertwoven with our 
corporeal posture in the world and are constituted by our 
intersubjective relations with others. Our sensorial and 
perceptual engagement with the world is always on the way 
to cognitive judgments—they inform our judgments.  Prior 
to cognitively evaluating an object, I have already 
encountered it within a common, meaningful, and social 
milieu.  
 
In contrast to the Cartesian account of the subject as a res 
cogitans, Merleau-Ponty stresses that I am my body. Against 
the Cartesian view of knowledge as the “internal adequation 
of the idea or self-identity of the thing,”xiii which reduces 
knowledge to mental representations, Merleau-Ponty 
maintains that thinking is a fully embodied event. My body 
is not primarily an object for me but is precisely the means 
by which I am connected to and intertwined with the world 
of objects around me. A fundamental wholism exists 
between mind, body, and world. Thinking “is not an 
invisible contact of self with self,” but rather, “it lives 
outside of this intimacy with oneself, in front of us, not in us, 
always eccentric.”xiv The actions we perform, especially 
those repeatedly—such as walking, writing, typing, reading, 
playing an instrument, holding objects in our hands, or the 
gestures that accommodate our speaking—are corporeal 
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activities we habituate into our ways of existing. They 
become sedimented into our bodies and do not merely 
“supplement” our cognitive acts but are part and parcel of 
what thinking is.xv This process of sedimentation means that 
our embodied experiences and repeated exposure to physical 
objects alter the way we think and inform how we go about 
our daily lives.xvi  
 
It is important to stress that such sedimentation on the 
cultural and social level occurs immediately. Merleau-Ponty 
writes, “This ‘culture,’ under the sedimentation of human 
activities, constantly impregnates the newborn from the first 
day. The individual lives with the demand to take up 
attitudes that contribute to form this context.”xvii On the day 
of our birth, we are introduced to a world of cultural artifacts, 
to voices that meaningfully direct us, and to faces that we 
can imitate.xviii Indeed, on the behavioral, sensorial, and 
perceptual levels, this sedimentation already takes place in 
utero. In the second trimester, the fetus can already hear the 
mother’s voice and will have the capacity to distinguish it—
and prefer it—from other voices at birth.xix And between 12–
15 weeks (end of first trimester and into the second), fetuses 
can bring their hand to their mouth 50–100 times per hour, 
thus priming them for a “centrally organized coordination 
that eventually comes to be controlled proprioceptively.”xx 
In other words, at birth, the infant already has a body 
schema, an intuitive understanding of the connectedness of 
its various body parts, and an ability to meaningfully imitate 
the behaviors of others. 
 
This embodied way of thinking is easily observed in what 
commonly goes under the rubric of habit. In the habits that 
make up our everyday lives, our bodies have a practical 
know-how for acting upon and responding to objects, but 
this knowing is not merely a kind of intellectualism that 
reduces thinking to mental representations. Nor are habits 
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merely a bunch of instincts or conditioned reflexes.xxi 
Rather, it is a kind of “communion with the environment.”xxii 
Habit, Merleau-Ponty adds, is a “form of [practical] 
intelligence [that] is not conscious of itself,” which resides 
in my corporeal posture toward the world and not in the brain 
alone.xxiii Elsewhere, he writes that habit “is knowledge in 
the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is 
made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that 
effort.”xxiv It is an affective and active relationship between 
the body and the world of things by which the self intuitively 
understands this relation but can also fluently improvise and 
adapt it to new situations. 
 
As a case in point, consider the act of typing, which I did 
while writing this essay. I can type around 90 words per 
minute, and such a speed requires a thorough intimacy with 
the location of the letters on the keyboard that is only learned 
through extensive practice and experience. When I type 
words at this speed, I do not have time to make a mental 
representation of each letter of each word that I write, nor do 
I have a mental image of the location and image of each key 
on the keypad. I don’t need to. Rather, the keys are an 
extension of my fingers, which work in intimate connection 
with my entire body. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “When I sit 
at my typewriter, a motor space opens up beneath my hands, 
in which I am about to ‘play’ what I have read. … It is the 
body which ‘understands’ in the acquisition of habit… To 
understand is to experience the harmony between what we 
aim at and what is given, between the intention and the 
performance—and the body is our anchorage in a world.”xxv 
In short, the fingers serve as an extension of the mind and 
the keyboard keys are likewise an extension of the fingers.  
 
But it is also my attunement to the entire situation of my 
laptop and my surroundings that allows me to accomplish 
the act of typing. It is not merely my fingers, but my entire 
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posture while sitting at my desk, the shape of my hands over 
the keyboard, and my being “in the zone” of my office space 
that contribute to both thinking and action. In fact, some 
research suggests that in some cases, physical movement or 
“motor preparation” appears to precede intentionality, that 
is, our bodies anticipate the necessary action before the brain 
tells the body to act.xxvi  
 
Or consider playing a sport like baseball or basketball. Shaun 
Gallagher notes that my capacity to play the game involves 
a fundamental attunement between my body and the physical 
and social context in which the game is played. When 
catching the ball, “The physical environment, the size and 
shape of the ball, along with the effects of all my previous 
practice (or lack thereof), and even the rules of the game as 
they are habitually expressed in the practiced movements of 
my body, may define how I jump to make the catch. . . . The 
body schema is much more selectively attuned to its 
environment than what physiology on its own will 
specify.”xxvii My hand learns how to conform to the contours 
of the ball in ways different than how my hand prepares to 
pick up a coffee mug or pick up my laptop. The hand can 
become so habituated into these behaviors that it takes these 
shapes without the brain explicitly telling it to do so. But it 
is important to add that habit is not limited to special skills 
that we develop. We are engaging in hundreds of habits on a 
daily basis—putting on clothes, driving to work, riding the 
elevator, brushing our teeth, and even walking or sitting in 
our own peculiar way. These are all things that we 
effectively perform with little explicit thought as our body 
has lived into these practices.  
 
Habit is a mode of thinking in the body, which lends support 
to the idea that cognition is fundamentally embodied. 
Supporters of the position of embodied cognition point out 
that much of contemporary cognitive neuroscience 
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continues, as Dan Zahavi writes, to be “bedevilled by a 
crypto-Cartesian and empiricist legacy. It might have 
replaced the immaterial Cartesian mind with the material 
brain, but it has maintained the dualism between brain and 
body, and thereby the logical structure of dualist 
psychology.”xxviii Mark Rowlands notes that despite its 
rejection of Descartes’s account of a nonspatial soul, the 
predominant current view of the mind as a neural network 
“left intact the second defining idea of the Cartesian 
conception: the idea that the mind is something that exists 
inside the head.”xxix This view of mind simply as 
“embrainment,” as David Morris suggests, reduces the body 
to a “dumb machine” that passively receives all of its 
commands to move from the motherboard, the brain.xxx  
 
For examples of this continued acceptance of Cartesian 
thought, consider the standard, prevailing views of theories 
of mind. Both theory theory and simulation theory depict 
cognition as a fully conceptually based process that is 
separate from perception, which “involves a retreat into a 
realm of theoria or simulacra, into a set of internal mental 
operations.”xxxi On these accounts, for the perception of an 
object to be meaningful and understandable, the brain must 
perform a secondary, higher-level function than what is 
accomplished on the level of perception. Importantly, this 
function involves an interpretation or translation of the 
perceived object through a conceptual or representational 
mechanism. On these accounts, observing the shock of pain 
on another’s face, for example, is not understandable in its 
own right, but is “theoretical, inferential, and quasi-scientfic 
in nature” (in the case of theory theory), or requires an 
analogical maneuver whereby the other is understood 
through an introspective projection of myself (in the case of 
simulation theory).xxxii  
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In response, theorists who have brought phenomenological 
inquiry to bear on cognitive neuroscience insist that mental 
phenomena are not limited to the head; rather “the mind can 
extend out into the body and even into the world.”xxxiii On 
this view, thinking is fundamentally embodied throughout 
our organs and is perhaps even embedded within the world 
around us as the brain requires “the right environmental 
scaffolding” in order to do its work.xxxiv My hand gestures 
do not merely help me to get my points across, they are part 
of the means by which I develop my ideas. The keyboard 
upon which I type, by engaging both of my hands at once 
rather than one (as in the case of handwriting), reshapes the 
way the brain functions and interacts with its environment. 
And the process of conversing with my friend actually 
expands my thinking and reveals new ideas within me that I 
did not know I even had.  
 
As a result, this means that in our routine, everyday 
encounters with others and the world, perception is often 
immediate. The shock of pain on the face of the other is 
understood directly on the level of perception and without 
mediation by some complex, mental, representational 
process. We do not have to conceptually postulate whether 
the person is thinking about pain or whether the other person 
has a cogito like we do. The person’s “mind” isn’t hidden 
from us; rather, the person’s thoughts are manifested 
explicitly through his or her bodily comportment and facial 
expressions.xxxv For sure, self-reflective cognition is 
necessary for abstract philosophical thought or mathematical 
equations, but this a derivative mode to our habitual way of 
encountering the world.xxxvi 
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EPIDURAL STIMULATION AS EVIDENCE FOR 
EMBODIED COGNITION 
 
Rowlands, echoing Merleau-Ponty, admits that such an 
account of mind “will strike many as a truly crazy idea that 
no one who is even remotely sane could ever accept.”xxxvii 
And yet this is precisely what is being suggested through the 
current research of spinal cord epidural stimulation. In 
parsing Susan Harkema’s personal comments about the 
project, it seems clear that she admits that she began the 
project with the presumption of the aforementioned 
Cartesian model. In one interview, she states: “We had 
always believed that human movement was controlled by the 
brain and the spinal cord was simply a conduit for those 
brain commands.”xxxviii Here Harkema echoes the revised 
Cartesian account of mind that reduces the mind-body 
relation to a series of networks or connections that process 
the discrete inputs by the brain in a computational manner. 
On this account, the brain sends complex symbols or 
messages to the rest of the body, which is reduced to an 
object that is activated and controlled by the brain. However, 
the conclusion of the trials suggests something more in line 
with Merleau-Ponty’s account. Harkema continues:   
 
But the results of these experiments suggest 
to us that the human spinal cord has a 
tremendous capacity for recovery even 
without reconnecting to the brain, that the 
spinal cord itself integrates complex signals 
from its environment and signals from the 
brain to then decide by itself what movement 
will happen and then execute that movement. 
. . . The details of the movement, of the 
control of movement, are really at the level of 
the spinal cord.xxxix  
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In other words, to some degree the spinal cord functions on 
its own by means of its own unique form of intelligence and 
utilizes present and previous experiences in order to know 
how to respond to its environment. The paralyzed subjects 
in the experiment regain movement despite the loss of a 
complex neural connection with the brain—the paralyzed 
bodies can adapt to this new orientation to the world—
because their bodies are functioning within a meaningful, 
embodied history of encountering the world, because they 
are drawing on a wealth of previous embodied habits and 
behaviors. When Harkema states that the spinal cord draws 
information “from its environment,” she is suggesting that 
embodiment and social context are not secondary but central 
to the very process of thinking, thus revealing a fundamental 
interdependence between self and world. Our body helps us 
to articulate our thoughts; our physical environment informs 
our mind of meaningful responses to external stimuli.  
 
If no complex signals are being sent from the brain to the 
body, then how are the four men able to willingly move their 
legs? It appears that the researchers remain open to two 
possible hypotheses. The first account theorizes that the 
brain is sending minimal, untraceable signals of 
intentionality to the limbs.xl  On this hypothesis, the four 
paralyzed participants can transmit the command to 
intentionally move their lower limbs because the intense 
therapy and exercise, along with the presence of the 
stimulator, has led to a rewiring of the brain and its neural 
networks. In other words, because of the plasticity of the 
brain, it could be that the brain is learning how to send 
information through alternative, though undetectable, 
pathways. Even if this theory is correct, it should be stressed 
that it is not the body that learns from the brain in this case, 
but quite the opposite, the brain is learning from the body. 
Echoing the Merleau-Pontyian account above, Harkema 
adds that we now must assign a certain degree of intelligence 
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to the body, especially the spinal cord. In her interview, she 
concludes:  
 
The spinal cord is as smart as the brain and 
that’s what these experiments are telling us. 
It can remember, forget, make decisions, 
create signals that control the muscles in a 
complex way, create commands, and I would 
even say, teach. What may be happening . . . 
is that the spinal cord is teaching the brain a 
brand new way for sending signals.xli 
 
This would be consistent with the findings of the field of 
phenomenological cognitive neuroscience. Again, Gallagher 
notes, “The brain, thanks to its plasticity, is shaped in part by 
the body’s movement. It is also clear that the organization 
and functioning of the brain depend on certain ‘adjustment 
reactions’ that take place throughout the body.”xlii The 
paralyzed men, in trying to learn how to stand again, are 
providing feedback to the brain and helping it learn new 
neuronal pathways that allow it to send and receive 
information.   
 
Harkema’s comments also imply that the researchers remain 
open to an even more radical, second hypothesis. This 
account suggests that the spinal cord has been reawakened 
to its own potential for action and needs no further input 
from the brain in order to learn from and interact with its 
environment and to give instructions to the rest of the 
body.xliii The researchers suggest that “human spinal 
circuitry” is enough “for eliciting motor patterns sufficient 
for standing” and that “supraspinal structures [are] not 
required to achieve full weight-bearing standing.”xliv The 
researchers believe that the electrical impulses from the 
stimulator “altered the excitability of the spinal circuitry 
allowing the load bearing related sensory information to 
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drive the circuitry to generate extensor motor patterns that 
supported standing without external assistance.”xlv On this 
reading, given that no complex signals from the brain can be 
detected, it would appear that the rewiring occurs on the 
level of the spinal cord alone. A “reorganization of the 
underlying spinal circuitry” occurs due to the “plasticity of 
the spinal neural circuitry.”xlvi The results of the presence of 
the stimulator, along with intense training and therapy, the 
researchers note,  
 
demonstrate the ability of the spinal networks 
to learn with task-specific training and 
improve motor pool recruitment. . . . 
Conceivably, after repetitive epidural 
stimulation and training, plasticity of these 
disrupted pathways could have resulted in a 
more functional state. The newly established 
functional connectivity presumably involves 
multiple, novel neuronal pathways and 
synapses.xlvii  
 
On this reading, the stimulator effectively reawakens the 
circuitry within the spinal cord itself and reminds it of its 
potential for meaningful, life-giving activity. In other words, 
as I interpret this hypothesis, the body is being reminded of 
its basic, fundamental habits—of its thousands upon 
thousands of experiences of movement, walking, standing, 
and interaction with the environment—that are still 
ingrained within the body’s memory. In an intriguing sense, 
this could be said to be analogous to Plato’s account of 
knowledge as recollection from the Meno. However, 
whereas for Plato, knowledge is obtained by the mind alone 
by remembering what it had known from a previous life or a 
kind of mind to mind communion with the Forms, in this 
case the knowledge is embodied and constitutes a 
reawakening of the habits and meaningful interaction with 
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the physical environment that the body had prior to the spinal 
cord injury.  
 
Even if some undetected signals are coming from the brain, 
there is no doubt that the body has been reawakened to 
meaningful activity and to communication with itself as a 
result of the epidural stimulation and intense therapy. This 
can be observed in the holistic improvements that have 
resulted in the four patients. Typically, when we think of the 
effects of spinal cord injuries, we only consider how they 
result in an inability to walk or feel the lower limbs. 
However, many quadriplegics and paraplegics also lose their 
capacity to control their bladder and bowel movements, to 
have sex, to regulate their body temperature, and to regulate 
their cardiovascular and respiratory systems. Amazingly, the 
researchers additionally report: “Other impairments . . . 
began to improve over time, in the absence of stimulation, 
such as blood pressure control, body temperature regulation, 
bladder control, and sexual function.”xlviii In other words, 
due to the epidural stimulation—again in patients who are 
sensory and motor complete—the four men have regained 
control of their cardiovascular health, their ability to regulate 
body temperature (e.g., sweat), and their capacity to have sex 
even when the stimulator is no longer turned on. The 
epidural stimulation is not merely simulating the kind of 
communication that the body would otherwise be receiving 
from the brain, but it functions as a kind of defibrillator that 
awakens the body to its meaningful purpose in the world, 
reinvigorates its ability to communicate with itself, and 
reveals a kind of sense or understanding that permeates 
throughout the body itself. Indeed, one might say that these 
basic bodily processes “accompany and are implicit in every 
kind of behavior and consciousness so that they define what 
is possible for behavior and consciousness but in such a way 
that they remain non-conscious.”xlix The body is telling itself 
to regain these basic bodily functions because the movement 
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in the lower limbs has informed the body that it is still alive 
and should remain so in order to actively engage with the 
world. And thus by reawakening these fundamental bodily 
processes, the body prepares itself for the possibility to stand 
again. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the past, some scholars have criticized Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological analyses of psychological and 
physiological phenomena, lamenting that “unless these 
[after-the-fact] interpretations are subject to further 
empirical testing, they remain unverified,” and thus, his 
conclusions remain “simply one of several possible 
theoretical accounts.”l The groundbreaking results of 
epidural stimulation and the interpretation of researcher 
Susan Harkema’s scientific data from these paralyzed 
patients who can now stand, however, provide the kind of 
empirical testing that gives credence to Merleau-Ponty’s 
insistence that thinking extends beyond the brain and is 
embedded in the body’s habitual encounters with the world. 
This essay makes manifest the possibilities for “mutual 
enlightenment between phenomenology and empirical 
science”li; however, further research and commentary is 
needed in order to determine the extent to which this 
embodied thinking goes beyond the spinal cord and into 
other parts of the body, to assess what aspects of Merleau-
Ponty’s thinking should be tweaked or rejected as a result of 
contemporary findings in cognitive neuroscience, and to 
consider the implications of this research for other fields of 
scientific inquiry and philosophical accounts of the subject. 
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NOTES
i Rejc, Angeli, and Harkema, “Effects of Lumbosacral Spinal Cord 
Epidural Stimulation,” 11. 
ii See Angeli et. al., “Altering Spinal Cord Excitability,” 1394–95, 
1398, 1407; Rejc, Angeli, and Harkema, “Effects of Lumbosacral 
Spinal Cord Epidural Stimulation,” 1–2, 4. While not a traditional 
academic source, a brief overview about the device and its success, 
including interviews with Dr. Susan Harkema and other researchers can 
be viewed at http://www.reevebigidea.org/the-research.  
iii “We have highlighted the importance to select individual-specific 
parameters in order to achieve standing with the least amount of 
assistance: stimulation parameters optimized for one individual resulted 
in poor standing and additional need of external assistance for hip and 
knee extension in the other participants” (Rejc, Angeli, and Harkema, 
“Effects of Lumbosacral Spinal Cord Epidural Stimulation,” 11; see 
also 16). 
iv Angeli et. al. “Altering Spinal Cord Excitability,” 1394–95; Rejc, 
Angeli, and Harkema, “Effects of Lumbosacral Spinal Cord Epidural 
Stimulation,” 1, 6.   
v Rejc, Angeli, and Harkema, “Effects of Lumbosacral Spinal Cord 
Epidural Stimulation,” 12. 
vi Ibid., 1. The researchers add, “The lumbosacral circuitry of the 
research participants was considered functionally isolated from 
supraspinal influence since they were classified as motor complete. . . . 
In addition, all other neurophysiological assessments performed 
without lumbosacral epidural stimulation did not indicate functional 
connectivity across the injury level suggesting that any of the above 
mentioned EMG modulation would be predominantly generated at the 
level of the human spinal cord” (12). In their previous paper, they noted 
that they tested for “residual descending input to the spinal circuitry” 
and concluded: “No changes were seen in the ability to activate motor 
neurons below the level of the injury during active voluntary attempts. 
No functional connectivity between the supraspinal and spinal centres 
below the level of injury was detected with clinical or 
neurophysiological assessments in any of the four subjects” (Angeli et. 
al., “Altering Spinal Cord Excitability,” 1395, 1396).   
vii See, for example, Fox, “‘The Wind on My Legs’”; Flatow, 
“Reawakening Limbs after Years of Paralysis”; Fletcher, “Epidural 
Stimulation Shows Promise”; Cohen, “Spinal Cord Work is an 
Unexpected Shocker”; Cohen, “How Paralyzed Patients Are Able to 
Stand Again.” The researchers have since expanded the number of 
individuals in the research program to 12 and are raising funds so that 
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more participants can be involved (Fletcher, “Epidural Stimulation 
Shows Promise”). 
viii Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, 65, cf. 79, 97, 102. 
ix Ibid., 97 
x Descartes, Discourse on Method, 32; Meditations, 82. For Descartes 
“the finite has nothing positive about it” (51). 
xi Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, 69. For more on how 
Descartes’s cognitivism continues to shape discourse in cognitive 
neuroscience and philosophy of mind, see Evans, The Multivoiced 
Body, 95–109, 320n46; Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind, 10–
13, 21–22. 
xii “Moreover, I find in myself faculties for certain special modes of 
thinking, namely the faculties of imagining and sensing. I can clearly 
and distinctly understand myself in my entirety without these faculties, 
but not vice versa…I perceive them to be distinguished from me as 
modes from a thing” (Descartes, Meditations, 97–98). “My mind is not 
immediately affected by all the parts of the body, but only by the brain, 
or perhaps even by just one small part of the brain, namely, by that part 
where the ‘common’ sense is said to reside” (102). Descartes appears to 
have believed that the mind is located near the “brain’s pineal gland” 
(Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind, 11). 
xiii Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 127. 
xiv Ibid., 234. 
xv Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind, 11, 17, 21. See also Evans, 
The Multivoiced Body, 94–116. 
xvi Dan Zahavi writes regarding sedimentation, “What I have learnt in 
the past does not leave me untouched. It shapes my understanding and 
interpretation of new objects by reminding me (in a completely tacit 
manner) of what I have experienced before” (Zahavi, Self and Other, 
132). 
xvii Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology and Pedagogy, 99. 
xviii Cf. Gopnik, Meltzoff, and Kuhl, The Scientist in the Crib, 24, 27–
30. See also Trevarthen, “The Self Born in Intersubjectivity,” 145; 
Hobson, The Cradle of Thought, 31–32, 34. 
xix Stern, The Interpersonal World of the Infant, 92. See also Gopnik, 
Meltzoff, and Kuhl, The Scientist in the Crib, 27–28. Other research 
suggests fetuses can respond to auditory stimuli as early as 19 weeks 
(Hepper and Shahidulla, “Development of Fetal Hearing,” F81–F87). 
xx Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind, 95. 
xxi Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology and Pedagogy, 196. 
xxii Ibid., 140. “In the classic view, habit does not concern the mind, but 
the body” (139). But habit “is neither a question of mechanical actions 
nor of intellectual operations. …The problem can be resolved if 
Merleau-Ponty on Embodied Cognition | Bahler 
88 
 
 
perception and motor functions are not artificially separated. In this 
way, the issue would always involve a certain perception of the 
situation, on the condition that one grants that this perception behaves 
according to a corresponding motor adaptation. …Child behavior 
develops not only under the influence of physicochemical stimuli, but 
also out of a communion with the environment” (140). 
xxiii Ibid., 212. Bracketed material in original. 
xxiv Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 166. 
xxv Ibid., 166–67. 
xxvi Cole, “Agency with Impairments of Movement,” 657. 
xxvii Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind, 142-43. 
xxviii Zahavi, “Naturalized Phenomenology,” 13n3. Cf. Morris, 
“Empirical and Phenomenological Studies of Embodied Cognition,” 
236, 240–41. 
xxix Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind, 12; cf. 2–3. 
xxx Morris, “Empirical and Phenomenological Studies of Embodied 
Cognition,” 240–41. 
xxxi Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind, 211. 
xxxii Ibid., 193, 194–95; cf. 196–99, 220–27.  For a longer reading of 
both theory theory and simulation theory, and how they have become 
more nuanced in recent years, see Zahavi, Self and Other, 107–11, 
150–73. 
xxxiii Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind, 7; cf. 13, 21. 
xxxiv Ibid., 4. 
xxxv Already as infants we have an “immediate” understanding of the 
other and can distinguish animate humans from inanimate objects. 
Thus, prior to language or arriving at an understanding of my self, “at 
the level of perceptual experience—we see or more generally perceive 
in the other person’s bodily postures, movements, facial expressions, 
directed gaze, gestures, and actions what they intend and what they 
feel, and we respond in a tightly coupled way” (Gallagher, How the 
Body Shapes the Mind, 208–09). For more on the argument that 
perception is immediate and direct see ibid., 82, 210; Zahavi, Self and 
Other, 121–27, 155, 164–70.  
xxxvi Cf. Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind, 212. 
xxxvii Ibid., 7. 
xxxviii In Flatow, “Reawakening Limbs After Years of Paralysis.”  
xxxix Ibid. These succinct and clear comments from the interview are 
supported by the conclusions stated in the peer-reviewed journals: “The 
related sensory information was integrated by the spinal circuitry to 
result in the complex motor pool activation showed during standing. . .   
In addition, all other neurophysiological assessments performed 
without lumbosacral epidural stimulation did not indicate functional 
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connectivity across the injury level suggesting that any of the above 
mentioned EMG modulation would be predominantly generated at the 
level of the human spinal cord” (Rejc, Angeli, and Harkema, “Effects 
of Lumbosacral Spinal Cord Epidural Stimulation,” 12). 
xl “We cannot exclude that supraspinal influences contributed to 
achieve standing since these four research participants were able to 
voluntarily move their legs when the lumbosacral circuitry was 
stimulated with specific stimulation parameters” (Rejc, Angeli, and 
Harkema, “Effects of Lumbosacral Spinal Cord Epidural Stimulation,” 
12). This seems to be the position of other neurosurgeons in the field 
who are outside observers to the research, such as Dr. V. Reggie 
Edgerton at UCLA (see Kern, “Spinal Stimulation Helps Four 
Patients”).  
xli In Flatow, “Reawakening Limbs After Years of Paralysis.” 
Elsewhere, the researchers conclude, “Conceivably, after repetitive 
epidural stimulation and training, plasticity of these disrupted pathways 
could have resulted in a more functional state. The newly established 
functional connectivity presumably involves multiple, novel neuronal 
pathways and synapses (Angeli et. al., “Altering spinal cord 
excitability,” 1407). 
xlii Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind, 143. 
xliii “These findings highlight the potential of the human spinal circuitry 
and its capability to generate motor patterns effective for standing in 
the absence of functional supraspinal connections when epidural 
stimulation is provided (Rejc, Angeli, and Harkema, “Effects of 
Lumbosacral Spinal Cord Epidural Stimulation,”16; italics mine). 
xliv Ibid., 12. 
xlv Ibid., 14; italics mine. 
xlvi Ibid., 15. 
xlvii Angeli et. al., “Altering Spinal Cord Excitability,” 1407. There is, 
perhaps a third hypothesis that is related to this second one. Dr. Roderic 
Pettigrew, director of the National Institute of Biomedical Imagining 
and Bioengineering (NIBIB), who has closely observed the research, 
believes that the stimulation is reprograming or rewiring the damaged 
nerve cells: “The thinking is that part of the injury process results in 
loss of nerve cells’ ability to respond as they once did to stimulation at 
a typical level. . . . What the researchers did not do is to directly excite 
the nerve cells to the point of triggering a response. . . . Rather, what 
they were trying to do was re-program the cells to that they respond to 
input” (Moran, “With the Help of Neurostimulation,” 11). 
xlviii Kern, “Spinal Stimulation Helps Four Patients”; italics mine. See 
also Moran, “With the Help of Neurostimulation,” 10. 
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xlix “Neuromuscular activity is an integral part of mental activity. …  
They include, for instance, processes that involve physiological 
tensions, throbbings, and rhythms that accompany normal, untroubled 
respiration, blood-flow, and heartbeat. Indeed, it is better to say that 
such prenoetic processes accompany and are implicit in every kind of 
behavior and consciousness so that they define what is possible for 
behavior and consciousness but in such a way that they remain non-
conscious” (Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind, 150). 
l Gallagher, “Phenomenology and Non-reductionist Cognitive Science,” 
26. 
li Ibid., 32. 
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